Yo, Strategic Communication Professionals!

Here's a market research document you can get your teeth into. It's about a brand suffering self-inflicted wounds of arrogance, myopia, stubborn resistance to changing demographics and willful ignorance of consumer desires. You know the phrase, " to the man who owns a hammer..."? There you go. I've synopsized some of the details:

• Marketing consists of tired cliches unironically and lackadaisically repackaged as fresh, relevant and compelling.

• Field reports and terminally high customer dissatisfaction numbers point out wholesale message failure. Headquarters response has been 'more of the same, louder this time."

• Strategic alliances and sympathetic franchisees are regularly given the impression of team membership and "open door" policy, only to be rebuffed when not meeting their practical and intended role as "rubber stamp" entities and helpful window dressing.

• Decisionmaking is chaotic and clustered amongst a few select mangerial elite, often leaving operations, distribution and marketing personnel struggling to rationalize the resultant unpredictable lurching and it's consequences to anxious subordinates and to a rapidly dwindling, disgruntled customer base. New initiatives and personnel come and go with much fanfare and little resulting follow-through, integration or benchmarking. Mid-level long-time direct-reports backchannel dismay at "imported" Senior executives placed in Divisional leadership positions outside their core experience, competence and interest.

• Underperforming Strategic Business Units in post-mature sectors receive the lion's share of management attention and corporate resources draining personnel, morale and cash from future revenue engines and untapped markets. Business development. and R&D is at a standstill excepting token efforts in the previously noted post-mature sectors. Brain drain soars, institutional memory and executional skill are seriously diminishing.

• Sales and promotion regimes and incentives are dictated top down and forego any localized adjustment to counter competitive claims or past company underperformance and underdelivery thereby seriously damaging salesforce credibility and negotiation power. (S.O.P is now exhorbitant 'give-backs'; rebates, refunds and spiffs merely to retain reluctant and suspicious customers to, in turn, maintan the appearance of a stable, albeit static market share.)

• As measured against the above marketplace realities, investment and ROI of capital, structures, vehicles and systems is past breakpoint and headed steeply south. Employee churn charts new highs, Brand "goodwill" is in freefall. Creditors, industry analysts and ratings agencies are using the words "crisis," "disaster and "willfull negligence" more and more, often in the same sentence.

Phew. It reads like other forensic organizational audits I've written, read or remediated, only worse--What a basketcase. And, what simple--i.e.: mindless mistakes. It's curative recommendations are, likewise, 8th-grade basic.

The company? Yours. Or, rather, you're a shareholder.

Introducing one hellaciously busted brand, America!™, as assessed by none other than the Defense Science Board of your Department of Defense. The document? Their 2004 Strategic Communications Audit [pdf - 1.7mb - 111pp] The group's bona fides? Here's a sampling of the kinds of whack-jobs they are:

Currently, the Board’s authorized strength is thirty-two members and seven ex officio members (the chairmen of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Policy, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, and Defense Intelligence Agency advisory committees). The members are appointed for terms ranging from one to four years and are selected on the basis of their preeminence in the fields of science, technology and its application to military operations, research, engineering, manufacturing and acquisition process.

In case that 111 pages makes your head hurt, well, here's one of several meaty pieces in the executive summary that say, yes, we have a massive communication challenge, but it stems mostly from misguided strategic understanding and reactive, narrow-sweep policy skills. In other words, calling a cowchip a Lily of the Field may make you feel better about your product, but it leaves Flower Consumers feeling unfulfilled and reticent to recommend repeat purchase. Put even simpler, "You can't buff a turd."

The Task Force met with representatives from the National Security Council (NSC), White House Office of Global Communications, Department of State (DOS), Department of Defense (DOD), Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), and the private sector (the schedule of meetings, briefings and discussions is contained in Appendix C). Based on extensive interaction with a broad range of sectors in the government, commercial, and academic worlds, as well as a series of highly interactive internal debates, we have reached the following conclusions and recommendations.

This Task Force concludes that U.S. strategic communication must be transformed. America’s negative image in world opinion and diminished ability to persuade are consequences of factors other than failure to implement communications strategies.

Interests collide. Leadership counts. Policies matter. Mistakes dismay our friends and provide enemies with unintentional assistance. Strategic communication is notthe problem, but it is a problem.

Understanding the problem. Strategic communication is a vital component of U.S. national security. It is in crisis, and it must be transformed with a strength of purpose that matches our commitment to diplomacy, defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security. Presidential leadership and the bipartisan political will of Congress are essential. Collaboration between government and the private sector on an unprecedented scale is imperative.

To succeed, we must understand the United States is engaged in a generational and global struggle about ideas, not a war between the West and Islam. It is more than a war against the tactic of terrorism. We must think in terms of global networks, both government and non-government. If we continue to concentrate primarily on states (“getting it right” in Iraq, managing the next state conflict better), we will fail. Chapter 2 of this report examines the complex nature of this new paradigm and implications for sustained and imaginative action.

Strategic communication requires a sophisticated method that maps perceptions and influence networks, identifies policy priorities, formulates objectives, focuses on “doable tasks,” develops themes and messages, employs relevant channels, leverages new strategic and tactical dynamics, and monitors success. This approach will build on in-depth knowledge of other cultures and factors that motivate human behavior. It will adapt techniques of skillful political campaigning, even as it avoids slogans, quick fixes, and mind sets of winners and losers. It will search out credible messengers and create message authority. It will seek to persuade within news cycles, weeks, and months. It will engage in a respectful dialogue of ideas that begins with listening and assumes decades of sustained effort. Just as importantly, through evaluation and feedback, it will enable political leaders and policymakers to make informed decisions on changes in strategy, policies, messages, and choices among instruments of statecraft. Chapter 3 of this report addresses ways in which strategic communication can be generated and managed with effect.

Leadership from the top. A unifying vision of strategic communication starts with Presidential direction. Only White House leadership, with support from cabinet secretaries and Congress, can bring about the sweeping reforms that are required.

Nothing shapes U.S. policies and global perceptions of U.S. foreign and national security objectives more powerfully than the President’s statements and actions, and those of senior officials. Interests, not public opinion, should drive policies. But opinions must be taken into account when policy options are considered and implemented. At a minimum, we should not be surprised by public reactions to policy choices. Policies will not succeed unless they are communicated to global and domestic audiences in ways that are credible and allow them to make informed, independent judgments. Words in tone and substance should avoid offence where possible; messages should seek to reduce, not increase, perceptions of arrogance, opportunism, and double standards. These objectives mean officials must take full advantage of powerful tools to measure attitudes, understand cultures, and assess influence structures – not occasionally but as an iterative process. Policies and strategic communication cannot be separated.... [All emphasis theirs.]

G'head. It's a fun, clear and candid read from an unusual source. It reminds me that I won't ever appreciate the skills of George Bush, CEO, for the same reason I don't particularly enjoy the work of Al Dunlap or Dennis Kozlowski or Pauly Shore.